Is Lahaina Really Building Back Safer… or Just Rebuilding Faster?

After the August 8, 2023 fire, officials promised Lahaina would not be rebuilt the same way. The phrase “build back better” became the standard line. But the real test is not what’s being said—it’s what’s actually being built. When you look closely at the official plans, the timelines, and what’s already happening on the ground, a more complicated picture emerges. The risks that failed Lahaina are now clearly documented, but the fixes for those risks are still incomplete, slow-moving, or only partially implemented.

The Plans Now Admit What Failed in 2023

The County of Maui’s recovery framework and the federal Community Development Block Grant–Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) Action Plan are explicit about what went wrong. These are not vague statements—they directly tie the 2023 disaster to failures in evacuation, infrastructure, and system redundancy. The plans identify a lack of evacuation routes, over-reliance on a single coastal highway, exposed utility infrastructure, wildfire risk along the wildland-urban interface, and vulnerabilities in water and communication systems. In other words, the government now formally acknowledges what residents had already been saying for years: Lahaina’s infrastructure was not designed to handle a fast-moving wildfire under extreme conditions.

This matters because it establishes a baseline. The failures are no longer debated—they are officially recognized. The real question is whether the solutions identified in those same documents are being built fast enough to matter.

Evacuation Was a Known Weakness—And New Routes Are Still Years Away

The recovery plans include specific, named projects to improve evacuation and connectivity. These are not conceptual ideas—they are listed infrastructure upgrades. They include the Lahaina Bypass Phase 1C and realignment of Honoapiʻilani Highway, along with a network of internal connector roads such as Papalaua-to-Aki, Kuhua-to-Komo Mai, Luakini Street extension, Keawe Street improvements, and multiple neighborhood connectors in areas like Wahikuli and Kanakea Loop. The goal is clear: reduce dead ends, connect neighborhoods, and create multiple evacuation paths.

However, the same County materials acknowledge that many of these projects are still in early stages—planning, environmental review, right-of-way acquisition, and funding. Some are projected to take between four and ten years to complete. At the same time, rebuilding of homes is already underway, with hundreds of units completed as of early 2026.

That creates a mismatch that cannot be ignored. The evacuation system that failed in 2023 is still largely the same system people are returning to today. The plans to fix it exist, but the physical network has not yet caught up. So while the County is planning for better evacuation, it has not yet delivered it.

Power Lines Were Identified as a Risk—Undergrounding Is Limited and Targeted

Post-fire assessments and recovery documents explicitly recommend undergrounding power lines in high-risk areas, particularly along evacuation routes and the wildland-urban interface. Hawaiian Electric’s wildfire safety strategy includes commitments to harden infrastructure and begin undergrounding in selected areas of Lahaina. A confirmed example is a roughly two to two-and-a-half-mile undergrounding project along Lahainaluna Road, chosen because of its importance as both an evacuation route and a high-risk corridor.

There are also discussions about undergrounding portions of Front Street and other key areas. But the scale of this effort is important. This is not a system-wide underground conversion. It is targeted, phased, and limited. Hawaiian Electric has stated that broader undergrounding is complex, expensive, and will take years to expand.

More importantly, the ignition zone for the 2023 fire was upslope, outside the main town area. Those areas still contain exposed infrastructure. So even if parts of Lahaina are improved, the larger system feeding into it remains vulnerable. The plans recognize the risk, but the solution is only partially implemented.

There is also a second issue that is less discussed but just as critical: falling poles don’t just contribute to fire ignition—they block evacuation routes. That happened during the fire. Roads were physically obstructed. So undergrounding is not just about preventing sparks—it is about keeping roads open. That connection is acknowledged in planning documents, but not yet fully addressed in execution.

Water, Power, and Communications Failed Together—Redundancy Is Still Being Built

The recovery plans also address failures in water infrastructure, particularly the loss of pressure linked to power outages. Without power, pumps cannot maintain system pressure, which affects firefighting capacity. The County’s Action Plan includes projects to harden water systems, add backup generators, and improve overall resilience of pump stations and distribution networks.

There are also broader discussions about improving communication systems and emergency response coordination. The 2023 fire exposed failures in alerts, including the non-use of sirens and breakdowns in communication networks. These issues have been widely scrutinized, including the role of emergency management leadership at the time.

However, like roads and utilities, many of these improvements are still in progress. Backup systems, redundancy, and hardened infrastructure are being planned and funded, but not yet fully implemented across the system. The vulnerability has been identified, but the fix is still being built.

Wildfire Risk Is Now a Formal Project—But Implementation Is Ongoing

The County has established a dedicated Wildfire Risk Reduction and Mitigation program as part of the recovery framework. This includes plans for vegetation management, creation of green breaks or fire buffers, and updates to community wildfire protection strategies. These efforts are aimed at reducing fuel loads and slowing fire spread at the edges of Lahaina.

This represents a significant shift from pre-2023 conditions, where these risks were known but inconsistently managed. However, the effectiveness of these measures depends entirely on implementation and long-term maintenance. At this stage, much of the work is still in planning or early execution phases.

Billions Allocated—But Infrastructure Upgrades Are Still Catching Up

Recovery funding has reached into the billions through a combination of federal aid, insurance, and legal settlements. The CDBG-DR Action Plan outlines major infrastructure investments tied to resilience and mitigation. Early funding included tens of millions directed toward Hawaiian Electric for system hardening.

At the same time, many of the large-scale infrastructure projects—road networks, full utility upgrades, and system-wide mitigation—are still moving through slower processes. Planning, permitting, and coordination across agencies continue to shape timelines. The result is a visible gap between funding announcements and completed infrastructure.

Homes Are Being Rebuilt Before the System Is Fully Fixed

As of early 2026, the County reports hundreds of housing units completed in Lahaina. Rebuilding is no longer theoretical—it is happening. Families are returning. Construction is active.

But this raises a critical sequencing issue. The infrastructure systems that failed—roads, utilities, redundancy—are not yet fully rebuilt or upgraded. That means people are moving back into a partially improved system, not a fully transformed one.

This is not a question of intent. The plans clearly aim for a safer Lahaina. The issue is timing. The rebuild of structures is moving faster than the rebuild of systems.

What the Plans Say vs. What Exists Today

If you read the official documents, Lahaina’s future looks significantly improved. There are more routes, stronger infrastructure, better planning, and a clear acknowledgment of past failures. But if you look at what physically exists on the ground today, many of those improvements are still incomplete.

That gap between plan and reality is where risk still lives.

What This Means for the Community

This is not just a government issue—it’s a public accountability issue. Different parts of the system require different types of follow-through. Road connectivity determines evacuation. Power infrastructure determines ignition risk and access. Water systems determine firefighting capability. Communication systems determine whether people even know what’s happening.

These are all separate systems, but in a disaster, they fail together—or they work together.

Bottom Line: The Knowledge Was There—The Follow-Through Is Still Catching Up

Lahaina is not being rebuilt exactly as it was. The plans are more detailed, more aware, and more focused on resilience. But the physical changes that matter most—roads, utilities, redundancy—are still incomplete.

The risk now is not lack of knowledge. The risk is the same pattern Maui has seen before: strong plans, slow execution, and a gap between what is promised and what is delivered.

The only question that really matters going forward is simple:

Are the critical fixes being completed before the next disaster tests them again?

Sources & References

Maui County – Lahaina Recovery Overview
https://www.mauirecovers.org/lahaina

Maui County – Rebuild Lahaina Plan
https://www.mauirecovers.org/recover/rebuild-lahaina-plan

Maui County – Wildfire Risk Reduction & Mitigation
https://www.mauirecovers.org/recover/wildfire-risk-reduction-and-mitigation

Maui County – Neighborhood Infrastructure & Timelines
https://www.mauirecovers.org/kuhuaneighborhood

Maui County CDBG-DR Action Plan (Draft)
https://hookumuhou.mauicounty.gov/DocumentCenter/View/473/Maui-County-Action-Plan—Substantial-Amendment-2—Draft-for-Public-Comment-3626

Maui Now – Undergrounding vs Rebuild Speed
https://mauinow.com/2025/01/19/bury-all-power-lines-or-rebuild-the-town-fast-in-lahaina-fire-recovery-its-hard-to-do-both/

Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization
https://www.hawaiiwildfire.org

Maui County News – Lahaina Housing Rebuild Update
https://www.mauicounty.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=18167